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## **Lower Class Mobilization and State Welfare Policy in the Era of Welfare Reform**

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### **Abstract**

The 1990s played host to the most significant changes in the American welfare system in the last fifty years—in particular, states were granted much wider latitude in deciding who is eligible to receive welfare. Taking advantage of these changes, we examine the linkage between lower class turnout and state adoption of restrictive welfare eligibility requirements after the passage of the historic welfare reform legislation of 1996. We find that in states where lower class turnout was relatively high, lawmakers were much less likely to pass a range of “get tough” welfare rules. Our findings provide novel support for the importance of electoral mobilization in helping the lower class achieve policies consistent with their interests. However, we also uncover evidence consistent with a “group threat” hypothesis in that states with larger lower class populations tended to adopt more restrictive welfare rules.

The impact of low voter turnout in the United States has been studied extensively in political science. A common justification for this research has been the strong suspicion that the low level of mobilization among disadvantaged groups quiets their voice in public debate. For example, Piven and Cloward (1989) suggested that because the lower class is not as mobilized as other groups, policy-makers have been less responsive to lower class interests, resulting in what has been characterized as a dismantling of the welfare state. Yet, when reviewing the literature on mobilization one is struck by the failure to confirm the conventional wisdom. On the one hand, numerous studies find significant disparities in turnout rates across different groups (e.g., Piven and Cloward 2000; Teixeira 1992; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). For example, African Americans, the poor, and the less educated are less likely to vote than their counterparts. On the other hand, despite these disparities in group mobilization, early research consistently found little or no policy consequences following from this inequality in participation. For example, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 111) conclude, "...these demographic biases [in turnout rates] do not translate into discernible overrepresentation of particular policy constituencies."

More recent research has found important exceptions to these null findings, however, with studies at the state level identifying major policy consequences associated with lower levels of political mobilization among disadvantaged groups. In a series of studies, for example, Kim Quaile Hill, Jan Leighley and others have uncovered support for the claims of Piven and Cloward (1989) by demonstrating that diminished levels of lower class turnout are associated with less generous state welfare benefits (e.g., Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill, Leighley and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Ringquist et al. 1997). Such findings are consistent with the common notion that higher levels of electoral mobilization lead to greater political representation for more active groups.

The current study builds on a substantial body of research examining the impact of lower class mobilization (LCM) on state welfare policy. Our approach differs from past studies in several important respects, however. In the first place, prior studies of LCM have been limited to an examination of state welfare *benefit* levels, which unfortunately do not vary a great deal within states over time and do not

track very well with more current efforts to reform welfare in the states (Fording 2003). By contrast, we follow the lead of recent research in examining changes in state welfare eligibility rules (e.g., increasing work requirements) (Fording 2003, Soss et al 2001), particularly those enacted in the latter part of the 1990s, following the historic welfare reform legislation of 1996. The degree of latitude devolved to the states immediately after the 1996 reforms was considerable. As detailed below, the states gained a good deal more authority over eligibility rules and administrative procedures than they had enjoyed for the previous three decades (Mettler 2000). Thus, if lower class mobilization has an impact on state welfare policy, such influence should be in evidence when state governments had the opportunity to enact dramatic policy changes in welfare eligibility requirements.

A second way in which our research differs from prior studies is that we consider other characteristics of the lower class that may influence welfare policy, in addition to LCM. Specifically, we argue that the relative *size* of the lower class population in a state may have important consequences for welfare policy outside the electoral arena. Another long tradition of research has consistently found that as the size of minority groups (i.e., African Americans) in a geographical area increases, support for policies favorable to that group diminishes, presumably because a backlash develops among the majority (i.e., whites) against the minority (Tolbert and Hero 2001; Jacobs and Helms 1999; Fording 1997; Radcliff and Saiz 1995; Giles and Buckner 1993; Key 1949). A similar scenario is likely to develop with respect to the lower class, for reasons detailed below. Thus, in our analysis of state welfare policy, we include the size of the lower class population in addition to LCM as determinants of welfare policy.

We begin with a brief review of past research on LCM, which leads us to hypothesize that, other things equal, states where lower class turnout is higher should be less likely to adopt stricter welfare eligibility requirements. Next, we review research suggesting that as the size of the lower class population in a state increases, states should be more likely to restrict welfare eligibility requirements. We then investigate the impact of these two factors (turnout and size), as well as a host of control variables, on states' decisions to restrict welfare policy after 1996. Consistent with our expectations, we find that while greater LCM tended to reduce the likelihood of states adopting stricter welfare requirements, states with a

larger contingent of lower class members were more likely to restrict welfare requirements— independently of a range of control variables. We conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of our findings.

### **Lower Class Mobilization**

The most extensive investigation of the impact of lower class mobilization on state welfare policy has been undertaken by Hill, Leighley and colleagues (e.g., Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill, Leighley and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Ringquist et al. 1998), who define LCM as the percentage of the lower class in a state that votes.<sup>1</sup> As mentioned above, for example, Hill, Leighley and Hinton-Andersson (1995) found, using pooled cross-sectional and time series data, that higher lower class turnout was associated with more generous state welfare benefits in elections from 1978 to 1990. The authors conclude that a more impressive showing by the lower class on election day influences elected officials to produce policy that is consistent with their interests.

Beyond this electoral impact, higher lower class turnout can affect welfare policy by invigorating social movements and thus boosting the political clout of the lower class. For example, Piven and Cloward (2000, 14-15) have recently argued that even symbolic electoral successes by the poor can protect and nourish social movements which, in turn, can exert leverage on state leaders. The authors point out that “movements are more likely to emerge when a climate of possibility has been created and communicated through the electoral system.” High rates of lower class participation in elections, then, can auger the perceived power of lower class movements. In addition, high levels of turnout by the lower class may reflect the degree to which the poor are already mobilized and thus constitute a cohesive political force outside the electoral arena. In short, for our purposes, greater lower class turnout should reduce the severity of welfare restrictions enacted in the states after 1996.

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<sup>1</sup> LCM is calculated by simply dividing the number of lower class voters by the lower class population in a state. In an earlier study, Hill and Leighley (1992) employed a measure of class bias in the electorate, calculated by dividing the percentage of the upper class who voted in a state by the percentage of the lower class who voted. However, the authors concluded that a simple measure of lower class voting percentages (i.e., our measure of LCM) is a better measure.

### **The Size of the Lower Class Population**

State welfare policy is also likely to be affected by another characteristic of the lower class—i.e., their relative size in the state population. Although at first blush it would seem that the political clout of a group should *increase* with the size of the group in a state, a substantial body of research predicts just the opposite relationship when the group in question is a minority that is held in low esteem by the majority. Most of this research focuses on the “group threat” hypothesis, usually applied to racial groups, which states that white racial animosity increases with the percentage of blacks in a state, county, or metropolitan area (e.g., Key [1949] 1984; Giles and Hertz 1994; Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt 1989). Several researchers have shown that in places where blacks constitute a larger portion of the population, and thus potentially wield more power, whites are more hostile to their political interests and respond by supporting racist candidates, switching party affiliations and opposing race-targeted policies (Tolbert and Hero 2001; Giles and Buckner 1993; Key 1949; but see Lublin and Voss 2000; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Voss 1996). In addition, studies find that the size of the black population influences policy (Jacobs and Helms 1999; Fording 1997; Radcliff and Saiz 1995; Bullock 1981; Keech 1968). In short, a large body of research supports the claim that as the size of the minority population increases, policies result that are inconsistent with its interests.

While class cleavages have not traditionally been as strong a political force in American politics as racial divisions, there is every reason to believe that the group threat hypothesis extends to the poor and the lower class as well as African Americans. In Gilens’ (1999) analysis of Americans’ hostility toward welfare, for example, it is clear that opposition to welfare policy stems as much from disdain for the poor as antipathy toward blacks. In addition, as the percentage of poor in a state increases, resentment of the needs and demands of the lower class are likely to grow, as well. State governments with a greater need for welfare spending but fewer resources to provide it (due to lower tax revenues and higher levels of unemployment) may feel pressure to tighten eligibility requirements to reduce welfare caseloads. In other words, as the lower class population increases, states will have greater need for benefits and fewer

resources to provide them. Again, the size of the lower class should be directly related to the stringency of state decisions to restrict welfare requirements.

In sum, the mobilization and the size of the lower class are likely to work in opposite directions in shaping state welfare policies. While a greater LC electoral turnout should make state welfare policy *less* restrictive, as the size of the lower class population increases, we expect states to pass *more* restrictive welfare eligibility requirements. We turn now to a discussion of the data and methods used to investigate these hypotheses.

## **DATA AND METHODS**

### **State Welfare Policy Changes: Dependent Variables**

In 1996, the federal government enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which abolished the federal-entitlement program (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) and replaced it with a state-based block-grant program (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF), which gave the states more freedom to decide various welfare eligibility requirements pursuant to the federal mandate of promoting work and reducing welfare rolls. States could follow national standards for minimum requirements or tighten eligibility requirements in a number of ways (e.g., increasing work requirements). After the passage of PRWORA, not only did policy changes in the states focus more on eligibility requirements than the size of welfare benefits (Schram 1999), but the large differences in state eligibility requirements have accounted for a good deal of the variation in caseload reduction across the states (Rector and Youssef 1999).

While a plethora of administrative and rules change were possible, researchers (e.g., Gilens 1999, Seccombe 1999) have argued that four types of state policy choices were central to welfare reform proposals and generated the lion's share of media attention and controversy: (1) providing stricter work requirements for recipients, (2) demanding shorter time limits for receiving benefits, (3) denying additional benefits to children conceived by recipients, and (4) imposing additional sanctions for client infractions.

In the analysis to follow, these four policy decisions (plus a summary index of the four) constitute our dependent variables, the measures of which are taken from Soss, et al (2001). The first three measures are assessed as dummy variables, where 1 indicates a more restrictive policy decision regarding eligibility requirements (0 otherwise). *Work Requirements* indicates whether a state demanded work from TANF recipients earlier than the federal requirement of 24 months. *Time Limits* indicates whether a state adopted lifetime eligibility cutoff for receiving benefits under TANF that is shorter (i.e., more restrictive) than the federally required 60 months. *Family Caps* indicates whether the state adopted a family cap for TANF recipients that would deny additional benefits to children conceived by recipients. *Sanctions* has three values indicating weak (coded 1), moderate (coded 2) or strong (3) sanctions policies to punish client infractions. Finally, because states who adopted one reform measure were likely to adopt another (the average inter-item correlation between the four policies is .30), we formed an additive index of *Welfare Restrictions* (alpha = .62). These and other measures are described more fully in the Appendix.

To assess the various ways in which the characteristics of the lower class in the states affected policy decisions, each of the five policy measures was regressed on lower class mobilization, the size of the lower class population, and a range of control variables in the following equation:

$$\text{State Policy Decision} = \text{LC Mobilization} + \text{Size of LC Population} + \text{Control Variables},$$

where the predictors are described below.

### **Independent Variables**

*Characteristics of the Lower Class.* Our state-level measure of lower class mobilization and lower class population size are derived from the U.S. Bureau of the Census's Current Population Survey, Voter Supplement File for the 1996 election. The large size of the survey, which includes data on 348,618 voting age respondents, allows scholars to develop measures of state-level characteristics by aggregating respondents by states. After identifying members of the lower class (i.e., individuals whose income is at or below the poverty threshold, see the Appendix), measures of lower class turnout and lower class population size were created for each state (see the Appendix for further details). As one might expect,

the two measures are negatively correlated ( $r = -.40$ ), such that lower class mobilization is higher in states with smaller lower class populations.

In addition to the characteristics of the lower class, state eligibility requirements are doubtless affected by a range of political, social and economic characteristics of the states, and it is essential to control for these forces in order to isolate the effects of lower class turnout and population size.

*Political Characteristics.* Several political characteristics have been found to affect state welfare policy, and so are likely to shape state decisions about TANF eligibility requirements. Because several studies have traced more generous welfare spending to more liberal state governments (e.g., Hill, Leighley and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Rom 1999), we include an indicator of state *Government Ideology* in 1996 based on the measure developed by Berry et al (1998). In addition, scholars have long held that political competition should lead to greater elite responsiveness to the needs of the disadvantaged (Key 1949); indeed, inter-party competition has been found to be an important predictor of state welfare generosity (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993; Hill, Leighley and Hinton-Andersson 1995). We therefore include a measure of party competition for 1996 to control for its potential influence on state TANF decisions.

*Socioeconomic Characteristics.* A variety of state socioeconomic characteristics should also affect decisions to restrict welfare eligibility. First, Soss et al. (2001) argue that in an effort to control the behavior of the poor, states adopted more restrictive TANF requirements to counter what critics of welfare called the problems of “illegitimacy” and “welfare dependency.” Thus, states with a higher than average percentage of births to unwed mothers (i.e., *unmarried birthrates*) or a higher *caseload-to-population ratio* were more likely to adopt restrictive requirements under TANF. A third factor identified by prior research to influence state welfare and TANF eligibility policies is the racial makeup of the recipient caseload. Fording (2003) found that states with a higher percentage of AFDC families headed by an African American (i.e. *percent black caseload*) were much more likely to adopt restrictive welfare requirements under waivers granted from 1992 to 1996. Continuing this trend, Soss et al (2001) found that states with more minority recipients adopted stricter eligibility requirements under TANF after 1996.

Finally, states with lower levels of *unemployment* are more likely to tighten welfare eligibility requirements to move people from welfare to work (Hill, Leighley and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Soss et al. 2001).

All variables are assessed for the year 1996, when PRWORA was adopted. The Appendix includes further details about all the measures used in the analysis below, as well as the various sources from which the data are taken.

### ANALYSIS

Table 1 reports the regression results (probit coefficients and standard errors)<sup>2</sup> for each of the state policy options and the summary index. We focus primarily on the effects of lower class characteristics (turnout and population size) in the first two rows of the table.

Table 1 about here

*Lower Class Mobilization.* Looking across the first row of coefficients in Table 1, the impact of lower class turnout is statistically significant in four of the five equations. Consistent with our expectations, states were less likely to adopt stringent work requirements, time limits and family caps if the lower class turned out in greater numbers in 1996. Subsequently, states with higher levels of lower class turnout were also much less likely to impose more restrictive welfare policies, overall, as reflected in the significant coefficient for the Welfare Restrictions Index in the last column of the table. Overall, the analysis reported in Table 1 provides compelling evidence of the importance of lower class mobilization. Just as prior research found that lower class mobilization affected welfare *benefit* levels in the states (e.g., Hill, Leighley and Hinton-Andersson 1995), a stronger showing by the lower class in the 1996 elections appears to have helped prevent the adoption of more stringent TANF rules in the states.

*Lower Class Population.* Support for the group threat hypothesis, as applied to the relative size of the lower class population in a state, is much more selective. While in most instances the coefficient for

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<sup>2</sup> Probit was used to estimate the first three equations, while ordered probit was used to estimate the Sanctions and Welfare Restrictions equations. Because standardized residual plots for three equations suggested some degree of heteroskedasticity, we employed robust standard errors, which provide for correct (i.e., robust) standard errors in the presence of violations in the assumptions of the model.

population size in is the expected direction, it attains statistical significance in only the Work Requirements equation. Thus, as the size of the lower class in a state increases, states were more likely to demand work from TANF recipients earlier than the federally required twenty-four months. In other words, as the size of the lower class population increases, state lawmakers react negatively by enacting more restrictive work requirements. Importantly, the impact of LC population in this instance is not due to various socioeconomic characteristics of the states (e.g., unemployment rate, caseload-to-population ratio), as we have introduced controls for these and other factors in our analysis. Thus, while the impact of the size of the lower class is neither large nor pervasive, our findings for the salient policy of work requirements are consistent with the notion that as the degree of perceived threat posed by a larger than average lower class population increases in a state, lawmakers respond with policies that are incongruent with lower class interests.

Figure 1 about here

To gain a better understanding of the significant effects of lower class mobilization, we display in Figure 1 the graphs of the predicted probability of states adopting stricter work requirements, time limits and family caps across the lower class mobilization scale.<sup>3</sup> As can be seen in the figure, for different values along the LCM scale, when holding other predictors at their mean, LCM appears pivotal in determining whether states adopted “get tough” welfare requirements. At the mean level of LCM, the probability of adopting stiffer requirements is about at the .5 level (actually between 40% for family caps and 56% for work requirements). Moving one standard deviation either above or below the mean on the LCM scale, however, makes an appreciable difference in whether states were likely to make TANF requirements more stringent. At low levels of LCM (i.e. one standard deviation below the mean), states were relatively likely to adopt stricter welfare requirements, with probabilities ranging from about .6 for family caps to about .8 for work requirements. At one standard deviation above the mean on the LCM scale, however, the likelihood of adopting stringent requirements was fairly low (with probabilities

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<sup>3</sup> Predicted probabilities were generated based on the probit results in Table 1 using the Spost program developed by Long and Freese for Stata 7.0 (2001). Probabilities are computed by varying LCM, while holding other predictors in Table 1 at their means.

between about .12 for time limits to about .22 for work requirements). By all appearances, then, the political power achieved by the lower class in states where it was more electorally active helped to discourage state lawmakers from passing more stringent welfare requirements than those imposed by the federal government.

In sum, our findings show that, as expected, LC turnout and population size significantly impacted selected state welfare policies after TANF, but moved lawmakers in opposite directions. For at least one of the four state policies, a larger than average lower class population created pressures to restrict welfare access, as predicted by the group threat hypothesis. At the same time, however, if the lower class makes a relatively strong showing in elections, it can demonstrate its electoral clout to lawmakers and help neutralize the natural tendency for states with large lower class populations to restrict access to welfare programs.

#### Other Predictors of State TANF Policies

While our primary interest lies with the influence of lower class characteristics on state welfare policy, the impact of the various control variables in Table 1 is also noteworthy. Most generally, changes in state welfare policies were clearly the product of a variety of political and socioeconomic factors, in addition to lower class turnout and population size. Like Soss et al (2001), we find that each of the control variables has a statistically significant impact on at least one of the four state policies in Table 1. Thus, government ideology and inter-party competition significantly affect sanctions policy, with more liberal government control and higher party competition leading to less strict sanctions policies. Various socioeconomic factors are important, as well. Consistent with professed efforts to “control the poor,” states with higher rates of unemployment and out-of-wedlock births (i.e., unmarried birth rate) were more likely to adopt stricter work requirements; and states with a higher welfare caseload (i.e., caseload-to-population ratio) adopted more stringent sanctions to punish client infractions of the new welfare policy rules. Notably, one of the more consistent predictors across the four policies is the percentage of welfare recipients who are African American (% black caseload). As others have found (e.g., Fording 2003, Soss et al 2001), states with a larger proportion African Americans receiving welfare in 1996 were much more

aggressive in tightening eligibility restrictions under TANF, thus documenting a longstanding relationship between race and welfare policy in the U.S. (e.g., Gilens 1999). In sum, it is reassuring to find that the results of similar studies hold even after the effects of lower class characteristics have been included in our analysis of state welfare policies.

## DISCUSSION

The 1990s played host to the most significant change in the American welfare system in the last fifty years. This period witnessed the debate, passage, and implementation of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which provided greater freedom to states by replacing the federal-entitlement program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, with the state-based block-grant program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The high profile of the political debate over this new program provided an opportunity for the lower class to make their policy preferences felt through political mobilization. Equal opportunity, however, was given to advocates of less generous welfare policy to influence decision-makers. Developments during this period therefore provide an excellent opportunity to examine the effects of lower class mobilization on state welfare policy.

In the present study, several general findings are noteworthy. First, taking advantage of the monumental changes accompanying welfare reform, our study demonstrates a strong linkage between lower class mobilization and several specific state welfare reform policy decisions. Specifically, in those states where levels of lower class turnout were relatively high, lawmakers were much less likely to pass more stringent, “get tough” welfare measures. Our findings are consistent with the arguments made by Piven and Cloward (2000) concerning the likely impact of electoral successes by the poor on policies that affect the poor. Greater electoral clout among disadvantaged groups in this case was clearly associated with stronger political representation for such groups. Our findings serve to bolster those of earlier studies documenting the linkage between lower class mobilization and benefit levels prior to the historic welfare reform legislation (e.g., Hill, Leighley and Hinton-Andersson 1995).

Of course, our findings with respect to lower class mobilization must be tempered with our results concerning the size of the lower class population in a state. In states where the lower class comprises a

larger share of the population, state lawmakers were more likely to pass at least one element of a “get tough” welfare reform program by insisting on more stringent work requirements for recipients. Because lower class turnout tends to be much smaller in states with a larger lower class population, one can surmise that poor states who need it the most were less likely to benefit from a politically empowered lower class.

## APPENDIX

### Sources and Measures

#### Independent Variables

1. Lower Class\* Mobilization: Proportion of the lower class that voted in 1996. Range = .176 - .423; mean = .286; standard deviation = .052. Source: Current Population Voter Supplement File, 1996.
2. Lower Class Population: Proportion of the 1996 population that is lower class. Range = .119 - .326; mean = .210; standard deviation = .043. Source: Current Population Voter Supplement File, 1996.
3. Interparty Competition for 1996: Range = .3 - .966; mean = .741; standard deviation = .182. Source: This data was obtained from Soss et al. (2001).
4. Government Ideology: Ideological score for each state government in 1996. Range = 1.25 - 93.875; mean = 39.820; standard deviation = 26.059. Source: Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson. 1998. "Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93." *American Journal of Political Science* 42:327-48.
5. State Unemployment Rate: Official unemployment rate for each state for 1996. Range = 3.1 - 8.1; mean = 5.192; standard deviation = 1.125. Source: Statistical Abstracts of the United States, <http://www.census.gov/statab/www/>.
6. Caseload-to-Population Ratio: Size of the state AFDC caseload divided by the state population for 1996. Range = .017 - .078; mean = .035; standard deviation = .014. Source: Statistical Abstracts of the United States, <http://www.census.gov/statab/www/>.
7. Unmarried Birthrate: Percent of total births to unmarried women in 1996. Range = 16 - 45.1; mean = 31.17; standard deviation = 5.71. Source: Statistical Abstracts of the United States, <http://www.census.gov/statab/www/>.
8. Percent of Caseload Black: Percent of the states' AFDC caseload whose head of household is African American in 1996. Range = .3 - 86.2; mean = 31.95; standard deviation = 26.25. Source: Department of Health and Human Services: Office of Family Assistance.

#### Dependent Variables (Soss et al. 2001, footnotes five and seven)

9. Work Requirements: Whether states have recipients shorter than the federal standard of 24 months to find work. Work requirements is a dummy variable: 1 = stricter than the federal standard (twenty-five states), 0 = not stricter (twenty-five states).

10. Time Limits: Whether states adopted time limits for receiving benefits shorter than the federal standard of sixty months. Time limits is a dummy variable: 1 = shorter than sixty months (twenty-nine states), 0 = not shorter (twenty-one states).
11. Family Caps: Whether states adopted caps on spending, not providing increased benefits for recipients who have children while receiving assistance. Family Caps is a dummy variable: 1 = did impose family caps (twenty-nine states), 0 = did not (twenty-one states).
12. Stringency of Sanctions: Penalties for failing to comply with the new welfare rules. This variable has three values: 3 = strong sanctions (fifteen states), 2 = moderate sanctions (twenty-one states), 1 = weak sanctions (fourteen states).

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**\*Defining Lower Class:** Lower class is defined here in terms of family income. While other studies (e.g., Hill, Leighley and Hinton-Andersson 1995) use several criteria in addition to income (e.g., job prestige, job authority, and education) to define the lower class, we maintain that family income is more than adequate for our purposes. The hypothesis that lower class mobilization should affect welfare policy assumes that members of the lower class have a shared economic interest in making welfare benefits more accessible to the poor, an interest that is based primarily on members' income levels. This also means that an individual with a low level of education who works at a blue-collar, "low prestige" job, yet earns income significantly above the poverty threshold does not necessarily share an interest in obtaining more generous welfare benefits because s/he is not at a comparable level of risk in dropping below the poverty level. Thus, while occupational prestige or level of education may be related to a psychological tendency to call oneself "lower class" (see Jackman and Jackman 1983), family income captures the essential economic reality of being poor that likely drives the relationship between lower class characteristics and state welfare policy that are the focus of this research. We use the 1996 Current Population Voter Supplement File to determine the number of lower class individuals in a state as well as whether they voted in the 1996 election. The measure of family income in the Current Population Voter Supplement File contains 14 income categories. We identify members of the lower class as those individuals whose family income falls within or below the income category that includes their poverty threshold for 1996 (based the size of the individual's household, (based on the size of the individual's household, see the Census Bureau's website, [www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld.html](http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld.html)).

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**Table 1. Predicting State Policies to Restrict Welfare from Lower Class Mobilization and Population Size**

	<u>Work Requirements</u>		<u>Time Limits</u>		<u>Family Caps</u>		<u>Sanctions</u>	
	Coeff.	Std. Err	Coeff.	Std. Err	Coeff.	Std. Err	Coeff.	Std.
<b>Lower Class Chars.</b>								
LC Mobilization	13.93***	5.41	13.94***	5.19	10.30*	5.53	5.86	3.61
LC Population Size	-8.85*	5.11	-5.93	4.53	4.30	4.62	-3.63	3.25
<b>Control Variables</b>								
Government Ideology	.013	.009	.002	.008	.006	.008	.021***	.007
Inter-Party Compet.	-1.59	1.21	-.605	1.38	.909	1.09	1.60*	.976
Unmarried Birth Rate	.111*	.062	.061	.053	.006	.055	.008	.033
Caseload-to-Pop ratio	2.19	21.37	32.04	21.76	-5.10	19.93	59.17***	17.6
% Black Caseload	.004	.009	-.021*	.010	-.032***	.011	-.028***	.008
Unemployment Rate	.875***	.306	-.030	.276	.360	.281	-.094	.211
Intercept 1	-9.42	3.07	-4.01	2.76	-5.48	2.92	2.74	1.85
Intercept 2							4.53	1.86
Intercept 3								
Intercept 4								
Intercept 5								
N	49		49		49		49	
Pseudo R2	.30		.22		.25		.31	
Method of Analysis	Probit		Probit		Probit		Ordered Probit	

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.025, \*\*\*p<.01

Note: Significance tests are for a one-tailed test. Higher values on the above variables indicate: more stringent policies, h mobilization (turnout) and population size, more conservative state governments, higher party competition, and higher rat variables.

Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Stricter Welfare Policies by Lower Class Mobilization

